UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549
SCHEDULE 14A
(Rule 14a-101)
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Signature Group Holdings, Inc.
(Name of Registrant as Specified In Its Charter)
NEW SIGNATURE, LLC
CHARLESTOWN CAPITAL ADVISORS, LLC
RAJ MAHESHWARI
LEE SMITH
BOUCHARD 10S LLC
CRAIG T. BOUCHARD
DUART HOLDINGS LLC
MALCOLM F. MACLEAN IV
STEVEN GIDUMAL
CLIFFORD D. NASTAS
(Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant)
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 A New Vision for
SGGH: Maximizing Shareholder Value
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
May 9, 2013
*
*
* |
 New
Signature As Time is Running Out!
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
A New Vision for SGGH
2
*
*
* |
  SGGH Is
Underperforming In All Respects First,
Signature’s
stock
currently
trades
40%
below
the
approximate
Net Asset Value (NAV)*.
A New Vision for SGGH
3
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
We know of VERY FEW
Acquisition
companies that trade below NAV.
*NAV
does
not
include
the
value
of
the
Net
Operating
Losses
(NOLs).
‘All calculations based on Company 10-K for the period ended December 31,
2012. **As adjusted per our calculations of current value.
NAV per Share':
$0.92-1.00
Share Price (May 8, 2013):
$0.55
Discount to NAV
40-45%
Net Asset Value Analysis
($mn's)
Assets
12/31/2012
Less:
12/31/2012
Cash and Equivalents
$54
Contingent Consideration
$4
Investment Securities
3
Notes Payable
37
Loans Receivable**
33
Term Loan
7
NABCO**
55
Seller Notes
3
Other Assets (Vera Manufacturing)**
10
Cosmed**
1
Reversal of Repurchase Reserve**
8
Total
$163
Total
$51
Approximate Net Asset Value (NAV)
$112
Approximate NAV per Share
$0.92-1.00
*
*
*
* |
 SGGH Is
Underperforming In All Respects Second,
Signature’s
market
cap
is
lower
than
the
value
of
its
Federal
NOL!
4
Note: Per the 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2012 (p.4), SGGH had a
federal NOL of $886.9 million. Note: This chart does NOT include the value of
Signature’s state NOLs. A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
*
* |
 Signature
Today Weak Board of Directors
Inexperienced Management
Failed to Execute a Strategy
Wasteful Cost Structure
We
believe
SGGH
trades
well
below
NAV
because
the
company
has:
5
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
*
* |
 Weak
Board Is running the company from Texas
Company HQ is in California
Deal flow is in New York and Chicago
Little discernible skill or experience with the
sorts of acquisitions appropriate to SGGH
CEO Chris Colville:
Absentee
Edward Lamb:
Pre-Bankruptcy Fremont Executive
John Koral:
Retired Contractor
Retired construction company executive
No public company experience
On board since Emergence from Bankruptcy
Robert Schwab*:
Retired
Works for Los Angeles Clippers’
basketball
club
Former senior executive at Fremont General
prior to bankruptcy
Least qualified member of the Board
Appears to have no experience searching,
sourcing, evaluating or executing business
transactions
The current board members lacks the skills and experience needed
to maximize the value of
Signature’s assets.
6
*
We believe Mr. Schwab has withdrawn his
candidacy for the Board
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
*
* |
 Weak Board
Needs Checks & Balances Why Does Sam Zell Care about SGGH?
Per Forbes, Sam Zell has a net worth
of $4B as of March 2013.
Zell’s ownership of SGGH stock
(11.3mm shares) cost EGI (Zell’s
Fund)
only
$5mm,
or
0.12%
of
Zell’s
net worth.
Sam Zell’s placement of one of his Managers on the Board coupled with the
Weak Board creates an environment for Potential Conflicts
We Believe Sophisticated Investors like Sam Zell and others like
him should
care
about the value (from the useable NOLs) residing in Signature
7
We believe sophisticated investors willing to backstop our deals
should be embraced
However,
we
believe
there
are
many
investors
that
will
work
with
us
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
*
* |
 Chaos In The
Boardroom 8
For
a
company
with
only
two
small
operating
businesses,
SGGH
has
had
extraordinary turnover in the Board of Directors. Since the 2010 Emergence
from Bankruptcy, 14
people have served on Signature’s board.
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
*
* |
 We
believe
Chris
Colville
is
NOT
the
right
CEO
for
SGGH:
Inexperienced Management
During Mr. Noell’s tenure:
SGGH failed to execute any
significant deals to utilize the
NOLs
The share price declined by
over 25% since Emergence
from bankruptcy,
underperforming the market by
over 70%
Signature generated over
$21mm in operating losses
9
Failed as Chairman of
SGGH
No M&A experience
or acumen
In the kind of deals necessary to
assure Signature success
Over the last year, Colville:
Provided board oversight
during the period of significant
shareholder value destruction
Approved the severance
package for Craig Noell, in
which the Board unnecessarily
paid Mr. Noell $650,000 in cash
and 2 million
shares of stock
and warrants
Had no succession plan in place
upon the resignation of Mr.
Noell
Upon becoming CEO, accepted
250,000 shares with
accelerated vesting untied to
performance
Protégé
of
Craig Noell
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
*
* |
 No Clear
Strategy And No Ability To Execute What do the replacement circuit breaker, cosmetics
and contract furniture manufacturing industries have to do with each other?
10
Signature
is
a
company
without
a
clear
strategy
for sustainable shareholder value creation
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
SGGH has only made small acquisitions in unrelated industries,
none of which create significant value for the company
We believe it demonstrates a ”seat-of-the-pants”
approach to
acquisitions and SGGH acquisition strategy
*
* |
 Wasteful Cost
Structure Share count has increased from 112.6mm in the first quarter post-
emergence to nearly 150mm (fully diluted) today, even though the
stock price has declined from $0.80 to below $0.60.
11
Operating Losses
2011: $3mm in salaries & bonuses for top executives
2012: $2.5mm in salaries & bonuses for top executives
November 2012: General Counsel Chris Manderson was hired by the
company for $1.1mm*
2013:
When Chris Colville was hired as CEO, he was awarded 250,000
restricted shares of stock with an accelerated vesting schedule untied
to Colville’s performance
Noell resigned, but the Board deemed separation as “termination
without cause”
Noell
was
paid
over
$650,000
in
unnecessary
cash
compensation
PLUS
Vesting of 1.5mn options and 500,000 shares of restricted stock
20 full-time employees at the parent/holding company level
Since Emergence from bankruptcy cumulative operating losses in
excess of $21mm
Excessive executive
compensation relative to
performance
Outrageous and
Unnecessary Departure Gift
to Craig Noell
Inefficient Staffing and
Excessive Overhead
Dilutive Stock Awards
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
*$270,000
base
salary
+
756,000
options
(vesting
over
3
years)
worth
approximately
$700,000
+
195,000
shares
of
restricted
stock
worth
approximately
$100,000
* |
 Wasteful Cost
Structure While
the
Shareholders
have
suffered,
the
Board
has
paid
itself
lavishly:
12
Sources: 2012 Company proxy filing (p. 14), 2012 Company 10-K/A (p. 4); 2012
Company 10-K (pp. 29-30).
And the Board has continued its lavish ways in 2013:
Additional Disclosed Director Payments in 2013:
Craig Noell
Resignation Payment
$650,000
2mn shares & options
Chris Colville
Gift of Accelerated Vesting
250,000 shares of stock
The 2012 payments are in addition to the $1 million in cash and stock paid to Chris Manderson
upon becoming General Counsel in 2012.
Year
Director
Compensation
SGGH Operating
Loss
2011
$810,275
($20,221,000)
2012
$853,224
($7,072,000)
Cumulative
$1,663,499
($27,293,000)
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
*
* |
 Our Vision For
A New Signature Appoint a seasoned CEO with the skills and experience
to maximize the value of Signature’s assets
Build a lean, experienced, capable, and professional
management team
Compensate employees appropriately for goals achieved
Top-notch Board to oversee value creation
Pursue meaningful acquisitions
Complete 1 or 2 large (goal of >$50mn in EBITDA)
transactions that will efficiently utilize the NOLs
Signature is the surviving company
Develop an appropriate capital structure. For example,
finance the transaction(s) with bank debt, high-yield
debt, cash and new equity
13
Our Mission is to raise the
stock price significantly
through a series of steps:
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
*
* |
 Our Slate For
A New Signature Board CEOs with public company experience
Strong corporate governance and existing company
knowledge
Appropriate and proven deal experience
Continued flow of deals that may be appropriate for
SGGH
Proven successful track record for investor and
shareholder value creation
A clear vision for generating value at SGGH
14
Unlike the current Board,
our slate offers:
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
*
* |
 SGGH Must
Consider Large Deals Higher EBITDA should result in a higher stock
price (allowing us to issue proportionally fewer
shares in an acquisition)
15
The bigger the deal, the higher proportion of
debt the market will allow to fund the
acquisition
Large Deals Should Allow More Efficient Financing:
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
Deal Structure Examples
Acquisition
EBITDA
25.0
$
35.0
$
50.0
$
75.0
$
100.0
$
Assumed Purchase Price
162.5
$
227.5
$
325.0
$
487.5
$
650.0
$
Multiple on EBITDA*
6.5 x
6.5 x
6.5 x
6.5 x
6.5 x
Financing
Debt
100.0
$
140.0
$
200.0
$
318.8
$
450.0
$
at 4.0x to 4.5x Coverage**
4.0 x
4.0 x
4.0 x
4.25 x
4.5 x
Cash on Hand to Use
30.0
$
30.0
$
30.0
$
35.0
$
35.0
$
New Equity to be Raised
32.5
$
57.5
$
95.0
$
133.8
$
165.0
$
Number of Shares at $0.65
50.0
88.5
146.2
na
na
Number of Shares at $1.10
na
na
86.4
121.6
150.0
*Estimate for target companies in our likely universe
**We believe the debt markets would allow us to use 4.0-4.5x leverage to finance an
acquisition. Dollars & shares in millions
*
* |
 SGGH Must
Consider Large Deals The faster the NOLs are utilized, the faster and
higher the stock should rise
16
Large Deals Should Create More Value For Shareholders:
The bigger the deal, the lower the interest rate
on new high yield bonds
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
Creating Stock Value
EBITDA
25.0
$
35.0
$
50.0
$
75.0
$
100.0
$
Interest Expense
11.0
$
15.4
$
20.0
$
31.1
$
42.8
$
Assumed Interest Rate
11.0%
11.0%
10.0%
9.75%
9.5%
Earnings before Taxes (EBT)
14.0
$
19.6
$
30.0
$
43.9
$
57.3
$
Net Income
14.0
$
19.6
$
30.0
$
43.9
$
57.3
$
Est. Number of New Shares
50.0
88.5
116.3
121.6
150.0
Est. Number of Total Shares
200.0
238.5
266.3
271.6
300.0
Earnings per Share (E.P.S.)
0.07
$
0.08
$
0.11
$
0.16
$
0.19
$
Stock Price at P/E multiple of 10
0.70
$
0.82
$
1.13
$
1.62
$
1.91
$
Stock Price at P/E multiple of 15
na
na
1.69
$
2.43
$
2.86
$
Dollars & shares in millions
*
* |
 Larger Deals
Deliver Greater Value Using
up
the
NOL
in
16
years
or
less
is
critical
to
maximizing the NPV Benefit of the NOLs
Every month of delay in closing a deal simply
burns more cash from operations
17
Large deals and speed are essential to maximizing the value of the NOL:
Small deals will never fully utilize the NOLs
Small deals also imply higher cumulative
transaction costs
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
NOL Time Usage
EBITDA
25.0
$
35.0
$
50.0
$
75.0
$
100.0
$
Earnings before Taxes (EBT)
14.0
$
19.6
$
30.0
$
43.9
$
57.3
$
Number of YEARs to use NOLs
64
45
30
20
16
NOL Amount today
890.0
$
890.0
$
890.0
$
890.0
$
890.0
$
Dollars & shares in millions
*
* |
 Larger Deals
Deliver Greater Value 18
Large deals and speed are essential to maximizing the value of the NOL:
A
New
Vision
for
SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
*Assumes: $100mn in EBITDA, generating $57.3mn in EBT, 40% tax rate. EBITDA and
debt outstanding remain constant. **Assumes: $25mn in EBITDA, generating $14.0mn
in EBT, 40% tax rate. EBITDA and debt outstanding remain constant. A $100mn
EBITDA company returns the NOL value to shareholders in 16
years*
A $25mn EBITDA company returns the NOL value to shareholders in 64
years**
The Present Value of the NOL
is
significantly higher
with bigger
deals.
Large deals deliver value to
shareholders much faster; while
small deals deliver value much
slower, if at all.
Value
Value
*
* |
 Recent Deals
Our Board Slate Has Evaluated 19
Transaction A:
Transaction B:
The New Signature Board Slate is seeing the type of deals that SGGH needs
Industrial Company with steady earnings and
EBITDA of approximately $100mm
Product Supply Company with $75mm of EBITDA
SGGH could have purchased at an attractive
price
Deal would have used the NOLs quite
effectively, creating value
A
New
Vision
for
SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
*
* |
 Conclusion
20
•
Weak Board with Inappropriate Talent Mix
•
Inexperienced Management
•
Ineffective Strategy (actually, NO
strategy)
•
Wasteful Cost Structure
The New Signature Board
slate offers:
•
CEOs with public company experience
•
Appropriate deal experience and access to deal flow
•
Demonstrated value creation for investors and
shareholders
•
A vision for generating value at SGGH
Please
vote
the
GOLD
Proxy!
Thank
you.
As
Time
is
Running
Out.
SGGH Today suffers from:
A
New
Vision
for
SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
*
* |
 New Signature
As Time is Running Out!
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
A New Vision for SGGH
21
*
*
*
*
* |
 Appendix
* |
 The New
Signature Slate 23
Craig Bouchard
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Cambelle-Inland, LLC, an entity
created in 2013 through which Mr.
Bouchard manages certain investment activities in China. Prior to founding
Cambelle-Inland, LLC, in 2010, Mr.
Bouchard founded Shale-Inland, a leading master distributor of stainless steel pipe,
valves and fittings, and
stamped
and
fabricated
parts
to
the
US
energy
industry
with
revenues
approaching
$1
billion.
Mr.
Bouchard
served as the Chief Executive Officer and later as the Chairman of the Board of
Shale-Inland through 2012. Before
he
founded
Shale-Inland,
Mr.
Bouchard
was
President
and
Vice
Chairman
of
Esmark,
Inc.,
a
publicly
traded
company
on
the
NASDAQ.
Mr.
Bouchard
co-founded
Esmark,
Inc.
in
2004.
Craig
was
named
a
finalist
for
the
2005
Ernst
&
Young
Entrepreneur
of
the
Year
Award
in
Illinois.
His
team
later
crafted
the
first
and
only
hostile reverse tender merger on Wall Street, successfully replacing 9 directors of Wheeling
Pittsburg Corporation
in
2007.
In
doing
so,
Esmark
became
the
nation’s
fifth
largest
steel
company.
During
Mr.
Bouchard’s
tenure, Esmark’s revenues grew from $4 million to over $3 billion. The company was one
of the highest appreciating stocks on the NASDAQ or the NYSE for the full year 2008.
The story was told in “America for Sale,”
Copyright 2009,
Craig T. Bouchard and James V. Koch (ABC-CLIO).
From
1998-2003,
Mr.
Bouchard
was
the
President
and
Chief
Executive
Officer
of
New
York
based
NumeriX,
a
risk
management
software
company
commanding
a
leading
market
share
on
Wall
Street.
Mr.
Bouchard holds a Bachelors degree from Illinois State University, a Masters Degree in
Economics from Illinois State
University,
and
an
MBA
from
the
University
of
Chicago.
He
has
been
a
member
of
the
Board
of
Trustees
of
Boston University and the Foundation of the University of Montana. He is currently a member
of the Board of the
Department
of
Athletics
at
Duke
University.
Mr.
Bouchard
holds
United
States
Patent
No.
4,212,168,
Power
Producing
Dry-Type
Cooling
Systems,
and
has
authored,
with
James
V.
Koch,
the
book
“The
Caterpillar
Way.
Lessons
in
Leadership,
Growth
and
Stockholder
Value,”
Copyright
2013,
(McGraw
Hill,
November
2013;
www.craigbouchard.com).
Mr. Bouchard has significant executive experience in a variety of industries, including
risk management, strategic planning, raising capital, financial engineering, a
distinctive record of business successes and considerable experience in growing his
companies both organically and through accretive acquisitions.
A
New
Vision
for
SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
*
* |
 The New
Signature Slate 24
Steve Gidumal
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
Since 2004, served as the co-founder, President and Portfolio Manager for Virtus Capital,
L.P., a firm based in Orlando, Florida that invests in the securities of companies in
distressed and restructuring situations, including a variety of real estate and
financial institutions. From August 2006 to August 2008, Mr. Gidumal also served as
Co-Portfolio Manager of Resurgence Asset Management, a distressed fund based in New York
City for which he co-ran
a
portfolio
in
excess
of
$400
million,
and
played
a
key
role
in
selling
operating
businesses
and
being
the
lead negotiator for a group of investors in the multi-billion Eurotunnel restructuring
and in the Smartalk litigation resolution.
Mr. Gidumal served on the Board of the Company from 2011-2012. He has also been a
director of Golden Gate Homes, Inc. since 2009, and has been the sole director since
2011. From 2011 to 2012, Mr. Gidumal served as the Chairman of the Board of Directors
of RoomStore, Inc., where he also served on the Audit Committee, the
Compensation Committee and the Corporate Governance Committee. From 2006 to 2008, Mr. Gidumal
served as
a
director
for
Sterling
Chemicals,
Inc.,
where
he
also
served
on
the
Compensation
Committee.
Mr.
Gidumal
also served on the Board of Managers for Mirant Corporate Asset Recovery (“MCAR”)
litigation trust from 2006 to 2012, where he was the lead negotiator in the litigation
with Southern Energy, where he negotiated a $202
million cash settlement which was paid to MCAR.
Mr. Gidumal earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Economics from the University of
Pennsylvania (Wharton undergraduate program) and a Master of Business Administration
from Harvard Business School as a Baker Scholar. Mr. Gidumal is a proposed Concerned
Stockholder Nominee in light of Mr. Gidumal’s significant
experience as an investor, board member and committee member. Further, Mr. Gidumal has
considerable expertise in financial statement audits and capital allocation.
*
* |
 The New
Signature Slate 25
Malcolm F. MacLean IV
Managing
Member
of
Duart
Holdings
LLC.
Mr.
MacLean
is
a
Founder,
Managing
Partner
and
Director
of
Star
Asia
Group, an opportunistic real estate debt and equity investment firm in Tokyo which was he
co-founded in 2006. Mr.
MacLean is also the co-Founder and Chairman of Delta Capital Investments KK, a student
housing and share- house
investment
company
based
in
Tokyo,
which
was
founded
in
2009.
Mr.
MacLean
also
serves
as
a
Partner
at
Taurus
Capital
Partners
LLC,
an
angel
and
venture
capital
investor.
From
2000
to
2009,
Mr.
MacLean
was
the
President
and
Head
Trader
at
Mercury
Global
Real
Estate
Advisors
LLC,
a
global
real
estate
investment
firm.
From
1992
to
2000,
Mr.
MacLean
was
a
senior
investment
banker
in
Kidder,
Peabody
&
Co.’s
and
PaineWebber
Inc.’s Real Estate Investment Banking Groups, specializing in originating, structuring
and executing of equity, debt and mergers and acquisitions transactions consummating
transactions in excess of $15 billion. Mr.
MacLean
earned
a
Bachelor
of
Arts
degree
in
Economics
and
Law
at
Trinity
College
in
Hartford,
Connecticut.
He
also
studied
International
Economics
at
Cambridge
University
in
the
United
Kingdom.
Mr.
MacLean
has
over
20 years of experience in the global investment business having structured and consummated
over $20 billion of investments. His expertise is in identifying and making deep value
and special situations investments and then creating additional value for investors.
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
*
* |
 The New
Signature Slate 26
Raj Maheshwari
A
New
Vision
for
SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
Managing Director of Charlestown Capital Advisors, LLC, a private merchant banking company
specializing in financial advisory/ merchant banking services (including mergers and
acquisitions advisory) to public and private market emerging companies. Under Mr.
Maheshwari’s tenure, Charlestown Capital has been a mergers and acquisitions
advisor
to
Esmark,
Inc,
a
steel
company
that
was
sold
to
OAO
Severstal
of
Russia
in
August,
2008
for
$1.3
billion.
Charlestown Capital continues to be a financial advisor to The Bouchard Group, the founders
of Esmark, Inc. and to their successor companies. In 2011, Charlestown Capital led the
successful reorganization of Meruelo Maddux Properties (subsequently renamed EVOQ
Properties), a commercial real estate company based in Los Angeles under Chapter 11 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Charlestown Capital, under Mr. Maheshwari’s leadership, has been a
strategic
mergers
and
acquisitions
advisor
to
emerging
companies
in
a
variety
of
sectors.
In
particular,
Charlestown
assisted in Shale-Inland’s acquisitions of Main Steel in 2011 HDSupply IPVF in 2012.
Charlestown Capital has also advised Akela Pharmaceuticals, LTS Lohmann, Artevea
Digital, among other emerging companies, in their mergers and acquisitions
activities. Prior to founding Charlestown Capital, Mr. Maheshwari was a portfolio
manager and managing director at Weiss Peck and Greer Investments (“WPG”).
From 1999 to August, 2005, Mr. Maheshwari was a Portfolio Manager and Managing
Director at WPG (and its successor parent company Robeco Investment Management). At WPG, he built
and managed a $500 million (approximately) Risk Arbitrage and Special Situations/Event Driven
hedge fund. In addition, at WPG and its parent company, Robeco Investment Management,
he was involved in many aspects of investment management, including asset allocation,
identifying new investment strategies, and overall investment management strategy.
From 1996 to 1999, Mr. Maheshwari was a Vice President of Research at Robert Fleming, Inc.,
where he helped run a $250 million (approximately) equity arbitrage portfolio.
Mr. Maheshwari holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Mathematics
and Computer Sciences from the State University
of New York at Albany and an MBA from New York University. Mr. Maheshwari has considerable
investing experience, as well as expertise in identifying and closing value enhancing
strategic transactions and in reviewing financial statements and capital
allocation. *
* |
 The New
Signature Slate 27
Clifford D. Nastas
A New Vision for SGGH
THE NEW SIGNATURE BOARD SLATE
Chief Executive Officer and a member of the Board of Directors of Material Sciences
Corporation (“MSC”), a leading global provider of material based solutions
for the automotive, electronics, appliance and construction industries, serving in
those capacities since December 1, 2005. Mr. Nastas served as President and Chief Operating
Officer
of
MSC
from
June
2005
to
December
2005,
and
as
Executive
Vice
President
and
Chief
Operating
Officer
from
October
2004
through
June
2005.
Prior
to
that
time,
he
held
numerous
executive
positions
with
MSC
from
January 2001 to October 2004. Mr. Nastas served as the Global Automotive Business Director
for Honeywell International Inc., a technology and manufacturing provider of aerospace
products, control technologies, automotive
products,
specialty
chemicals
and
advanced
materials,
from
1995
until
he
joined
MSC
in
January
2001.
Mr. Nastas served as an independent member of the Board of Directors of Quixote Corporation
and sat on its Audit Committee from 2009 until the company was sold in March
2010. Mr. Nastas earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Chemical Engineering from Wayne
State University and an MBA from Case Western University. Mr. Nastas has significant
and successful senior management experience and a wealth of public company board
service experience. *
* |